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INTRODUCTION
The modern economy involves far more commerce centered
around the exchange of information than it did twenty years ago.1
Information is any collection of concepts or details about the operation of the world around us, and can help us to understand what we
do, how we can do those things more efficiently, and lead us to discovering new possibilities. The growth in the rate of exchange of
information over twenty years, and its utility for commerce, has
been spurred by innovations in electronic communications and
analysis, and in turn has spurred additional technological innovations. At times, information is the good placed into commerce,2
while at other times goods and services are offered so as to make
use of information.3 The degree of competitiveness within different
information-related markets differs widely—there are many manufacturers of smart phones, but relatively few social networks with
large usership such as Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Pinterest, and
Google Plus.4
1

See Chuck Jones, Ecommerce Is Growing Nicely While Mcommerce Is On A Tear,
FORBES (Oct. 2, 2013, 10:08 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chuckjones/2013/10/
02/ecommerce-is-growing-nicely-while-mcommerce-is-on-a-tear/.
2
See, e.g., DC Denison, Big Data for Sale: Data Marketplaces, ACQUIA (Mar. 25, 2013),
http://www.acquia.com/blog/big-data-sale-data-marketplaces (describing public and
proprietary data gathered and marketed by vendors such as DataMarket, Factual,
Windows Azure Data Marketplace, ManyEyes, Public Data Explorer, Public Data Sets on
AWS, and Infochimps).
3
See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT,
INFORMATION ECONOMY REPORT 2013: THE CLOUD ECONOMY AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES xi (2013) available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ier2013
_en.pdf (defining cloud computing as “a paradigm for enabling network access to a
scalable and elastic pool of shareable physical or virtual resources with on-demand selfservice provisioning and administration”).
4
See, e.g., The eBusiness Guide, Top 15 Most Popular Social Networking Sites,
EBIZMBA, (Mar. 2015) http://www.ebizmba.com/articles/social-networking-websites
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What distinguishes competition in a market infused with informational elements as opposed to physical goods, or services?
Can information be controlled, even monopolized, by a single firm?
In that same strain, when is information so unique, complex, or
otherwise distinct that a potential competitor in its use cannot feasibly replicate it from another source or by independent effort? Assuming that information is not readily substitutable, and that such
information is monopolized by a firm, can the information be called
an essential facility or resource for competition in a marketplace?
An example of information that is subject to monopolization involves the use of pharmaceutical distribution agreements (and a
related regulatory order from the FDA) to prevent potential competitors from acquiring the information about the drug necessary to
know whether they can compete with a pharmaceutical manufacturer after filing an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA).5
This case was recently bolstered by the filing of an amicus brief by
the Federal Trade Commission in the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey.6 The plaintiff alleges that the defendant is using the FDA’s order and its distribution agreements to
prevent potential generics from purchasing sufficient quantities to
conduct bioequivalence testing.7 Hence, the defendant is restricting access to the information essential to filing an ANDA and permitting generic entry.8

(on file with author) (indicating seven social networks exist with over 100,000,000 unique
monthly visitors, with Facebook having three times the second-most popular, Twitter).
5
See Brief for Federal Trade Commission as Amicus Curiae at 1, Mylan Pharms., Inc.
v. Celgene Corp., (No. 2:14-CV-2094-ES-MAH (D.N.J.) (ongoing 2015), 2014 WL
2968348, at *1; see also Jonathan Hatch and Thomas W. Pippert, FTC Submits Amicus in
Mylan v. Celgene, Citing Potential Refusal to Deal Concerns, Mondaq 2014 WLNR
25603756 (Sept. 16, 2014) (discussing the FTC’s amicus brief filed in support of plaintiffs
in Mylan). There is presently an interlocutory appeal being considered in the Mylan case
regarding whether a prior voluntary course of dealing is a necessary element of a refusal to
deal claim under the antitrust laws. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Celgene Corp., No.
14-2094 (ES)(MAH), 2015 WL 409655, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 30, 2015).
6
See Brief for Federal Trade Commission as Amicus Curiae at 1, Mylan Pharms., Inc.
v. Celgene Corp., (No. 2:14-CV-2094-ES-MAH (D.N.J.) (ongoing 2015), 2014 WL
2968348.
7
See id. at *2.
8
See id. Note that interlocutory appeal has been certified to the Third Circuit in this
case on the question of whether a prior course of dealing is a required element for a
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Another framework supporting the potential monopolization of
information that one should consider is the following: Firm “X” is
a monopolist in the market for the provision of Internet service in a
geographic region.9 As an Internet Service Provider (ISP), Firm X
is able to gather certain information about its users such as age,
demographics, wealth, and especially the amount and nature of Internet usage by each individual user. Assume next that Firm X uses
the collected pool of information to create a new product or service, such as a personalized bulletin of regional events of interest
that is generated from predictive analysis of the individual and aggregated data. Assume further that comparable products cannot be
created absent a similarly detailed body of information about the
pool of potential consumers. Last, assume that, apart from the provision of Internet services, there is no economically practicable
method for obtaining the information about Internet users.
Under these numerous assumptions, the monopolist has exclusive access to a resource essential to competing in the new product
market. Thus, by the economic fluke of being a legally sanctioned
monopolist in one market, the monopolist has the building blocks
for an independent second monopoly. If others had the ability to
access and innovate from that foundation it is also possible that additional products or services could be devised from the information
the monopolist is privy to. Is this reality simply a windfall for a monopolist, and if so, is there a mechanism under the antitrust laws to
inject competition into the subsequent markets? Is antitrust intervention even necessary when measured against the economic incentive to sell access to the information at a monopoly price that
extracts the same profits the monopolist could have made through
its own exclusive use of the information?
Although the essential facilities doctrine, which grants a limited
right of course to essential resources,10 is potentially the bestsituated antitrust theory to require access to information that could
spur innovation, it is so narrowly defined under current antitrust
Section Two refusal to deal. Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Celgene Corp., No. 14-2094
(ES)(MAH), 2015 WL 409655 (D.N.J. Jan. 30, 2015) (letter order).
9
Whether by regulatory decisions or a natural monopoly created by the high fixed
costs of establishing a network of Internet distribution.
10
See infra Part II.
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law that one can question its existence.11 However, information
economies have certain attributes that could reinvigorate the essential facilities doctrine.12 As such, even barring a relaxation of the
necessary elements for an essential facilities claim, the essential
facilities doctrine may find application in an information economy.13 Included in this discussion are a variety of economic and policy arguments for why a less stringent definition of the essential
facilities doctrine might be beneficial in an information economy,
as opposed to a more traditional economy.
The essential facilities doctrine from antitrust law can address
this consideration and continue to foster competition in information economies, as well as encourage innovation based on the
exchange of information or ability to exchange information. Part I
will discuss what is considered to be an information economy and
the characteristics that are attributable to information economies,
while Part II of this Note will briefly summarize the essential facilities doctrine under current law. Part III of this Note will then discuss the application of the essential facilities doctrine to information economies, including how any distinguishing features of
information economies should or do alter the essential facilities
analysis. A brief conclusion on the utility of the essential facilities
doctrine as applied to information economies is then included.
I. DEFINING INFORMATIONAL ECONOMIES
Information can be an open resource to all seeking to use it, or
be considered a form of intellectual property with some degree of
associated private control.14 From one angle, providing unrestricted access to information permits the dissemination and utilization
11

See, e.g., Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1074 (10th Cir. 2013)
(“Essential facilities doctrine offers perhaps an even more controversial example still” of
theories of liability for unilateral action.).
12
See discussion infra Part III.A.
13
See discussion infra Part III and Conclusion.
14
See Onnig H. Dombalagian, Licensing the Word on the Street: The SEC’s Role in
Regulating Information, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 4 (2007) (“Scholars have long debated the
level of protection that should be given to intellectual property (including information)
that falls outside the traditional paradigms of patent and copyright law . . . . At the heart of
the debate is the perceived need to balance private incentives to produce information
against the social benefit of making it broadly accessible.”).
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of the existing pool of knowledge,15 while the intellectual property
angle supports a system of incentives meant to encourage the development of new information.16 Often different types of information exist within one market structure. For example, the financial markets regulated by the SEC can be considered to have at
least five kinds of information: company-generated information,
market information, formulae to create derivatives, contracts and
product design for financial instruments, and the rules for preparing and spreading information.17 Further, information has multiple
purposes, only some of which are economic or innovation focused.
Information, in many forms, has as much intellectual, political, or
social value as economic value.18
Networks19 are often central to information economies, permitting the gathering and distribution of information, and providing
the added attractiveness of great interconnectivity.20 Network industries come custom-built with two potential choke points for the
distribution of information: interfaces where information producers
introduce their content, and the point of distribution to the con-

15

Although open access may also encourage development of new information, those
adding to the pool of collective knowledge are not legally entitled to recoup any of the
monetary value of their contributions, as is a fundamental incentive justifying many
intellectual property regimes.
16
See Dombalagian, supra note 144, at 4–6.
17
See id. at 6.
18
See, e.g., Niva Elkin-Koren, Making Room for Consumers Under the DMCA, 22
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1119, 1119–21 (2007) (“The use of DRMs turns information, once a
non-excludable public good, into an excludable commodity . . . . While many concerns
raised by the [commoditization of information by DRMs]—such as price and consumer
friendliness—are relevant to all types of commodities, other concerns are closely
connected to information policy. These new mechanisms for physical control over the use
of copyrighted works may threaten intellectual freedom and fundamental liberties.”).
19
By “network,” I am referring to markets defined by network economic effects,
where the value of a good or service increases as the overall number of branches grow:
telephones, the Internet, social networks, etc. See, e.g., Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher
S. Yoo, Rethinking Broadband Internet Access, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 28 (2008).
20
See Mark Cooper, Open Access to the Broadband Internet: Technical and Economic
Discrimination in Closed, Proprietary Networks, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1013 (2000)
(“Networks are the essence of the e-world and the internet century into which we are
embarking. Global scale, fluid movement of information, and commerce have created a
new economy, a new mode of production.”).
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sumer.21 The Internet itself consists of various networked physical
and electronic resources, the existence of which facilitates the great
variety of websites and Internet applications we see today.22 Two
aspects of the Internet’s architecture are “essential inputs into
downstream production of applications and content,” namely the
network of interconnected physical resources, and the logical
standards that permit communication between those resources.23
Access to these resources is essential for the many applications distributing email, messages, and other information content, as well as
for the production of websites, blogs, and other Internet-specific
content.24 Monopolizing the physical or logical infrastructure of
the Internet is unlikely, but one can easily see the implications for
competition if a competitor was able to deny access to those resources to its competitors.
Some authors posit that there is an increasing need to recognize
the ways in which we exchange information as commons, and to
regulate them as such, because private property rights fail to maximize their potential contributions to the public welfare.25 In particular, the idea is that “the most important commons—like highways or electricity, information or the Internet” avoid the necessity
of overcoming transaction costs and allow for low-cost innovation.26
21

See id. at 1013 (stating that many of the facilities at the choke points were historically
exclusive, and many may still be natural or economic monopolies).
22
See Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons
Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 1005 (2005).
23
Id. at 1005.
24
See id. at 1005 n.334.
25
See, e.g., id. at 918–919 (exploring the demand-side implications of treating
infrastructure and information as an open access commons); see also Yochai Benkler,
Review: Commons and Growth: The Essential Role of Open Commons in Market Economies,
Infrastructure: The Social Value of Shared Resources, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1499, 1499–1500
(2013) (arguing that symmetric access to an open class of potential users, allocated
through a non-price mechanism, is beneficial for commons-type goods).
26
Benkler, supra note 255, at 1502–03 (“The symmetric-use privileges that typify the
most important commons—like highways or electricity, information or the Internet—
avoid the need for transactions at the margin and allow for low-cost exploration in an
uncertainty space through experimentation, reassessment, and adaptation to new
information. Commons obtain this high flexibility at the cost of the power to appropriate
the benefits of the new action through control of the resource set that enabled it, requiring
enterprises to seek different leverage points and strategies of appropriation. The elegant
institutional parsimony of property rights, by contrast, is that, under certain well-
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Another lens for viewing information economies is looking for
the platforms that support diverse ecosystems of products and services.27 Scholars debate whether these platforms should be analyzed under the net-neutrality framework,28 antitrust tying analysis,29 or the essential facilities as discussed here.
Some of the markets with relatively few competitors—such as
social networks—are affected by the economics of networks, where
more users equal greater value to all users.30 Network-defined markets tend to support a smaller number of competitors than other
markets, and often “tip” towards one of the early entrants once a
sufficient level of interconnectivity is achieved.31 There is unlikely
to be a broadly defined market of “social networks.” Instead, the
market is likely defined more narrowly by social networks intended
for a particular purpose: Facebook and Twitter for social purposes,
LinkedIn for professional networking, and Pinterest for shared interests.32
Not all information economies are driven by the value of networks to consumers. Some, like big data analytics, benefit from the

understood conditions, they combine flexibility, information gathering, and an
appropriation mechanism into a single institutional entity and can be brought to bear at
the point of action - the transaction. But under the actual conditions of complex modern
economies—which exhibit transaction costs and, more importantly, are pervaded by
uncertainty (not merely risk) and replete with unknown unknowns—property can often
slow down both owners and potential users.”).
27
See, e.g., Jeffrey Jarosch, Novel “Neutrality” Claims against Internet Platforms: A
Reasonable Framework for Initial Scrutiny, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 537, 538 (2007) (“In
today’s Internet, the most important players are not manufacturers, designers, or
programmers, but platforms. . . . They offer an environment in which users operate, a
starting point for them to interact, work, network, and be entertained. These platforms
build upon the infrastructure of the Internet.”).
28
See id. at 539.
29
See id.
30
See The Secret to Scaling Social Networks and Local Marketplaces, PLATFORM
THINKING, http://platformed.info/scaling-social-networks-and-marketplaces/
(last
visited Mar. 11, 2015).
31
See Reverse Network Effects: Why Today’s Social Networks Can Fail As They Grow
Larger, WIRED, http://www.wired.com/2014/03/reverse-network-effects-todays-socialnetworks-can-fail-grow-larger/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2015).
32
See About Pinterest, PINTEREST https://about.pinterest.com/en (last visited Mar. 27,
2015).
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information available about large masses of consumers.33 Others,
such as financial markets, benefit from the ability of resources to be
efficiently allocated as a result of exchanges of information.34 When
information is the good in question, then the ability of the information to be found, accessed, and used by the most interested parties becomes important. Research databases, whether Lexis or
Westlaw among the legal providers, or JSTOR or SSRN in the
larger academic community, aim to aggregate, organize, and disseminate the information they contain. For some the information
and accompanying effort and services are offered for a fee, while
others such as SSRN, or even Wikipedia, are open to all comers.
And information itself has value, whether for making informed
decisions with monetary consequences like loan negotiations,35 for
Google or Bing to refine their search algorithms based on usefulness to searchers,36 or for expansion into a new market that requires familiarity with information that is expensive to acquire.37 If
one competitor has the information with certain characteristics
necessary to enter a market where competitiveness depends on access to that information, but withholds it from potential competitors, consumers can be harmed.38 Where there could have been
numerous competitors using an essential pool of information to innovate and create products that attract consumers, instead there is
one competitor determining what product will be developed for the
33

See Justin Hienz, Introduction: Defining the Data Movement, in U.S. CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE FOUNDATION, THE FUTURE OF DATA-DRIVEN INNOVATION 11 (2014),
available
at
http://www.uschamberfoundation.org/sites/default/files/Data%20Report%20Final%201
0.23.pdf.
34
See Dombalagian, supra note 144, at 1 (“Information is said to be the lifeblood of
financial markets . . . . [Financial information is necessary] for the efficient allocation of
capital in the global economy.”).
35
See Ruling on Motion to Dismiss, In re: LIBOR-Based Financial Instruments
Antitrust Litigation, 935 F. Supp. 2d 666 (No. 1:11-md-02262 (NRB), slip op. at 4–8
(S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 29, 2013), available at http://sdnyblog.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013/03/11-MD-02262-2013.03.29-Ruling-on-Motion-to-Dismiss.pdf.
36
See Frank Pasquale, Search as Speech: Two Scenarios, CONCURRING OPINIONS, 2012
WLNR 11280685 (May 29, 2012) (available on Westlaw Next).
37
See Hienz, supra note 333, at 2–6.
38
See Sergio Baches Opi, The Application of the Essential Facilities Doctrine to Intellectual
Property Licensing in the European Union and the United States: Are Intellectual Property
Rights Still Sacrosanct?, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 409, 481 (2001).
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market. This has the serious potential to result in higher prices and
fewer competing products, as well as fewer products for consumers
to purchase in general.
Google scans the information in the inboxes of users of Gmail.39
Facebook has access to information connecting individuals through
their geographic ties, educational experiences, social and familial
activities, and across a span of years.40 Apple has access to the collective multimedia purchasing habits of millions of users, just as
Amazon does for a far larger universe of purchases. It is not fundamentally improper for these companies to have acquired the information in their possession, and possession of the information
does not necessitate having an anticompetitive purpose in mind.
The information is in their possession as a result of the large network of purchasers they have attracted to their products, and is a
side effect of that success.
If Google takes the collective information from it users’ email
and begins to develop a program to offer unsolicited suggestions of
websites, literature, and products for consumers, it has an information advantage over its competitors if they do not have access to
a comparable source of information. This advantage does not come
from greater investment in research for the new market, but instead as a result of the information accompanying its network of
integrated Google products. The same would be true of Facebook
branching into real estate location suggestions based on its
knowledge of the residents of a neighborhood, or Amazon offering
financial investment advice based on the detailed purchasing histories of its users and the predictive value of that information.
Each of the new products or services that can be offered using
the described pools of information is in a market that could be subject to competition. However, without access to a comparable informational resource, the competitors will be unlikely to offer
products that are on the same plane as those developed with the
information. Consumers will be better off if the information, which
was accrued as a result of a different economic enterprise, is shared
39

See Privacy Policy, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/privacy/
#infocollect (last visited Apr. 7, 2015).
40
See Data Policy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/policy.php (last visited Apr.
7, 2015).
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on reasonable terms as an essential facility in order to facilitate
competition on the products that can be developed from that information.
II. THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE
Amongst the variety of anticompetitive practices that have
been alleged as tools of monopoly or dominant firms is the denial of
a facility essential to competition.41 The essential facilities doctrine
posits that it is anticompetitive to allow a monopolist in a market
that has exclusive control over an input essential to that market to
deny potential competitors access in order to concentrate control
over that market.42
In MCI Communications Corp. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co. the Seventh Circuit articulated the four elements of the
essential facilities doctrine: “(1) control of the essential facility by a
monopolist; (2) a competitor’s inability practically or reasonably to
duplicate the essential facility; (3) the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the facility.”43 The first element under MCI necessarily has two subelements that also need to be proven: a defined market in which the
defendant is a monopolist over the facility or resource; and the defined market for which the facility is purportedly essential.44 Another aspect is implicated by the first MCI factor, but is addressed
directly in the second MCI element: the essential nature of the facility. If sufficiently close substitutes existed, or if the facility were

41

See, e.g., TCA Building Co. v. Nw. Resources Co., 873 F. Supp. 29, 39 (S.D. Tex.
1995).
42
See, e.g., Opi, supra note 388, at 437–39.
43
MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132–33 (7th Cir.
1983). Note also that the essential facilities doctrine is occasionally conflated with the
antitrust doctrines of refusal to deal, and the antitrust duty to deal, which have different
required elements from the essential facilities doctrine. See, Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft
Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1074 (10th Cir. 2013) (distinguishing refusal to deal from the
essential facilities doctrine). For example, refusal to deal requires a pre-existing profitable
relationship between firms. See id. at 1074–75.
44
See TCA Building Co., 873 F. Supp. at 34.
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easily replicated, then the facility in question would not be essential.45
Monopoly power is, in a nutshell, the ability to raise prices
without losing profit in information economies as well as other
markets. A firm with monopoly power is not constrained by its
competitors, so that raising prices to a monopoly level equates to
increased profits as opposed to an unprofitable loss of business to
competitors.46
Monopolization is the active behavior with an intent to acquire
or maintain the power to raise prices supracompetitively through
anticompetitive means.47 The state of being a monopoly is not itself
a base of liability.48 Monopolies that exist or are maintained as a
result of business acumen, historic accident, or changes in consumer demand are not the object of the antitrust laws.49 It is only when
a firm seeks to obtain a monopoly and presents a substantial danger
of succeeding,50 or attempts to maintain a monopoly through anticompetitive measures, that there is liability under the antitrust
laws.51
Firms can compete against one another based on price or quality within a market for a good—and attempt to monopolize the provision of that good—or firms can compete for a market that can only support a single firm. Price competition within a market can occur when multiple firms produce highly substitutable goods, thus
pushing prices down towards marginal cost.52 Markets with this

45

See, e.g., MetroNet Servs. Corp. v. Qwest Corp., 383 F.3d 1124, 1129–30 (9th Cir.
2004); TCA Building Co., 873 F. Supp. at 39.
46
See Novell, 731 F.3d at 1070.
47
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT
UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT, at 5 (2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/236681_chapter1.pdf.
48
See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429–30 (2d Cir. 1945).
49
See id.; see also Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61–62 (1911); Daniel F.
Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Mandating Access to Telecom and the Internet: The Hidden
Side of Trinko, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1822, 1826–27 (2007).
50
See Novell, 731 F.3d at 1071 n.2 (citing Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447,
459 (1993)).
51
See id. at 1070.
52
See MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1123 (7th Cir.
1983).
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dynamic can, and are expected to, support multiple firms.53 By
comparison, some markets are natural monopolies that can only
sustain a single firm of large scale, whether a local telephone network54 or the market for PC software55 in information economies.
Frequently, these markets are described as Schumpeterian markets, where the competition is for the market in a serial set of contests to become the sitting monopolist.56
If a market is capable of supporting multiple firms competing
on quality or price, then market share is a useful proxy for market
power.57 Although the amount of market share necessary to raise
prices is different on a case-by-case basis, one rule of thumb is that
there can be no market power with a share of 33% or less; there may
be market power with a share of 60% or more; and market power
may generally be presumed with a share of 90%.58 In markets competing on price and quality, monopolization is best understood as
the anticompetitive effort to consolidate market share sufficient to
raise prices.59 Informational markets supporting multiple competitors competing on price or quality do not require a different form of
analysis than comparable traditional markets for monopoly power,
or monopolization.60 Monopoly power is represented by the proxy
of market share, or direct evidence,61 while monopolization continues to be the attempt to acquire or maintain the desired power

53

See Marina Lao, Search, Essential Facilities, and the Antitrust Duty to Deal, 11 NW. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 275, 291–97 (2013) (discussing the distinction between markets
facing dynamic competition compared to price competition).
54
See Axel Gautier and Manipushpak Mitra, Regulation of an Open Access Essential
Facility, 75 ECONOMICA 662, 662 (2008).
55
See Richard Schmalensee, Antitrust Issues in Schumpeterian Industries, 90 AM. ECON.
REV. 192, 192–96 (2000).
56
See id.
57
See, e.g., Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1076–77 (10th Cir. 2013).
58
See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945).
59
See, e.g., LAWRENCE J. WHITE, MARKET POWER AND MARKET DEFINITION IN
MONOPOLIZATION CASES: A PARADIGM IS MISSING, (Jan. 24, 2007) available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/hearings/single_firm/docs/222104.pdf.
60
See Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property Policy, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 534, 593–94 (2003).
61
See United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 190–91 (3d Cir. 2005)
(concerning direct evidence in a section 1 case).
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through anticompetitive means, including abuse of an essential facility.62
If competition in a market is more aptly described as competition for the market, then defining market power is conceptually
more difficult. Successful possession of the market equates to high
market share and the ability to set prices,63 but there is the added
behavioral constraint of who might be on the horizon to take the
market with a new product if the return to the sitting firm is too
lucrative, or self-innovation too slow.64 Just as a competitor should
not be punished for succeeding at the task society asks of it,65 a
competitor who succeeds and wins a market that makes it a de facto monopolist should not be liable to, or handicapped relative to, its
potential competitors.66
Monopolization in this environment takes on an entirely new
color. Monopolists should be permitted to, and encouraged to,
compete on the merits because this is what drives innovation and
better prices for consumers.67 However, the development of dynamic markets should not be impeded by the actions of the sitting
monopolist because this forecloses new benefits from competitive
enterprise.68 This is especially true if that monopolist is using the
sword of monopoly control of an essential resource and is simultaneously adopting the shield that market power is difficult to infer in
a market imbued with Schumpeterian tendencies.69
A. Procompetitive Purpose of the Essential Facilities Doctrine
The essential facilities doctrine, on its face, appears to reinforce
the requirement that competitors compete on the merits of their
products and not on advantages resulting from factors outside the
particular market, like the supply of inputs. If competition is the
mechanism provided by markets to drive down costs and improve
62

See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 499, at 1826–27.
See Schmalensee, supra note 55, at 194.
64
See id.
65
See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
66
See Schmalensee, supra note 55, at 194–95.
67
See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 499, at 1827–28.
68
See Tilman Klump and Xuejuan Su, Open Access and Dynamic Efficiency, 2 AM.
ECON. J.: MICROECON. 64, 64–66 (2010).
69
See id.
63
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the quality of products and services, then foreclosing competition
on all of the features other than the essential input due to one party’s exclusive control is detrimental to consumers.70 Antitrust law
is intended to foster competition where practicable in the name of
consumer welfare, and the essential facilities doctrine can be seen
as a means of protecting or injecting competition into a market susceptible to monopolization due to structural factors.71
B. Limits of the Essential Facilities Doctrine
The essential facilities doctrine is not without its skeptics,
shortcomings, intellectual and practical difficulties. As Justice Scalia noted in Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V.
Trinko, LLP, the Supreme Court has never expressly embraced, or
even used the essential facilities doctrine.72 The essential facility
may find its intellectual roots in Supreme Court doctrine,73 but it
has not received subsequent recognition by the Court to-date. Although the Supreme Court has not accepted the essential facilities
doctrine, neither has it expressly rejected it.74 Because of this,
plaintiffs have continued to bring claims under the essential facilities doctrine, and at least some courts have entertained them.75 A

70

See, e.g., Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1073 (10th Cir. 2013).
See Lao, supra note 53, at 287.
72
540 U.S. 398, 411 (2004).
73
See, e.g., United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912) (an essential
point of rail line access into St. Louis); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S.
366 (1973) (an essential means of power transmission to a local distribution network); see
also Opi, supra note 388, at 435–39.
74
See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411 (“ . . . we find no need either to recognize it or repudiate
it here.”).
75
See, e.g., MetroNet Servs. Corp. v. Qwest Corp., 383 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 2004)
(Trinko was decided “[e]ven though the essential facilities doctrine is followed in this and
other circuits”), on remand from Qwest Corp. v. MetroNet Servs. Corp., 540 U.S. 1147
(2004) (following decision on Trinko); Covad Commc’ns Co. v. BellS. Corp., 374 F.3d
1044, 1049–50 (11th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that the essential facilities continues in a
more restricted form), on remand from BellS. Corp. v. Covad Commc’ns Co., 540 U.S.
1147 (2004); Sunbeam Television Corp. v. Nielsen Media Research, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d
1341, 1349–50 (S.D. Fla. 2011); Nobody in Particular Presents, Inc. v. Clear Channel
Commc’ns, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1112–14 (D. Colo. 2004). Contra Novell, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1072 (10th Cir. 2013) (reiterating opposition to the
essential facilities doctrine); cf. SolidFX, LLC v. Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc., 935 F. Supp.
2d 1069, 1083 (D. Colo. 2013).
71
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final decision on the utility of the essential facilities doctrine is still
percolating in the district and circuit courts.
Further, lower courts have applied the requirements articulated
in MCI in a narrow fashion, requiring a high degree of control by
the monopolist, significant barriers to reproduction of the facility,
articulable means of permitting access, and denials of access without sufficient alternate justifications.76
C. What is an Essential Facility in the Information Economy?
There are numerous situations when a particular form or quantity of information is necessary to compete in a market. As illustrated in the introduction, knowledge of the bioequivalency of patented pharmaceutical compounds to potential generics is necessary to file an ANDA.77 Search engines require multitudes of data
from users on the utility of results in order to “train” and refine
the algorithms.78 Even political data services require vast stores of
information about the electorate to identify and capitalize on the
possibility of micro-targeting likely voters during election cycles.79
Information can therefore be essential for competition in a marketplace.80 For example, in financial markets, much of the information
about financial instruments is available publicly through the marketplace or through disclosures eventually, but even differential
timing of access to the information can impact commerce, and
greater restrictions on access “might result in the limitation of
downstream uses.”81
76

See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 499, at 1848–49.
See Brief for Federal Trade Commission as Amicus Curiae at 1, Mylan Pharms., Inc.
v. Celgene Corp., (No. 2:14-CV-2094-ES-MAH (D.N.J.) (ongoing 2015), 2014 WL
2968348, at *3.
78
See Pasquale, supra note 366.
79
See How ‘Microtargeting’ Works in Political Advertising, PBS NEWSHOUR (Feb. 18,
2014, 6:27 PM), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/how-microtargetingworks-political-advertising/.
80
See, e.g., Dombalagian, supra note 144, at 1–2 (“The availability of and access to such
[financially related] information on reasonable terms has been identified as one of the
essential characteristics of strong financial markets.”) (discussing the SEC’s role in
regulating access to information in financial markets).
81
See id. at 83 (suggesting that the SEC should consider prohibiting vertical integration
of “essential” information with entities downstream where there are potential conflicts of
interest, but that “[o]therwise, privately adopted limitations on information or other
goods that are “inputs” for subsequent processes are best left to antitrust law”).
77
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In addition to information itself being essential for competition,
access to the channels of distribution of information can be essential. The essential facilities doctrine, although tentatively traceable
in its early expression to concerns about access to the infrastructure supporting commerce by railroad82 may be most applicable
when the facility in question is akin to an infrastructure resource.83
Sometimes that information can be acquired through the investment of any interested competitor, or the information is openly
shared. Databases exist for many types of information on a subscription basis, from records of commercial transactions, social activities online, and data sets collected by international organizations.84 Surveys may be commissioned.85 Research, experimentation, and individual effort can develop the required information.86
Government and academic resources have compiled many data sets
that are open for commercial use, or commercial uses may be negotiated for.87 Or, competitors can often buy the underlying data directly from a willing competitor.88

82

See Spulber and Yoo, supra note 499, at 1829 (discussing how Terminal Railroad was
decided under section 1 of the Sherman Act, as it was a collective group of railroads
excluding access to the facility to competitors, and also that multiple other means of
bringing goods and people into the community existed).
83
See Benkler, supra note 255, at 1529 (discussing Frischmann’s analysis of ideas,
intellectual property, telecommunications, roads, and ecosystems as forms of
infrastructure broadly, and treating that infrastructure as a subset of a legal commons); see
also Lao, supra note 53, at 287–90 (discussing how two of the most applicable market
structures for the essential facilities doctrine may be natural monopolies, especially in
infrastructure, and public utilities).
84
See Hienz, supra note 373, at 3.
85
See, e.g., SURVATA, http://www.survata.com/how-it-works; SURVEY MONKEY,
http://www.surveymonkey.com/audience; QUALTRICS, http://www.qualtrics.com/.
86
See John Raidt, The Competitiveness Agenda, in U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
FOUNDATION, THE FUTURE OF DATA-DRIVEN INNOVATION 31, 32–33 (2014),
http://www.uschamberfoundation.org/sites/default/files/Data%20Report%20Final%201
0.23.pdf (discussing the technologies such as sensors that can generate information about
consumer use of products).
87
See Leslie Bradshaw, The Great Data Revolution, in U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
FOUNDATION, THE FUTURE OF DATA-DRIVEN INNOVATION 21, 26 (2014) (discussing
Harvard’s Engineering Social Systems program, as well as non-profit and governmental
data sets).
88
See, e.g., Denison, supra note 2 (discussing Microsoft’s Windows Azure Data
Marketplace).
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In other circumstances, significant barriers exist to the acquisition of the needed information. If, for example, an aggregation of
information about a number of consumers, or an equivalent large
database of information, is necessary in order to develop a product
in an informational market, then all potential entrants in that market will be seeking that information.89 However, the size of that data set may require purchasing access to multiple pre-existing commercial databases at a combined cost that is prohibitive.90 Or, if it is
necessary to develop the information from the ground up, the perunit cost of information may be prohibitively expensive to justify
gathering solely for the purpose of developing a single product in a
single market.91 Absent some other reason that the information
would be developed—for example, value in multiple markets that
defrays the costs or its creation as a side-effect of a separate,
tipped, network-economy market—there would be little incentive
for any potential entrant to develop the good.92
Acquisition, or creation, of the information may be infeasible
both practically and economically. Either the costs of creating the
resource exceed any potential profits, or if multiple parties invest in
developing the resource separately the resulting pool of profits is
not large enough to divide and successfully recoup anyone’s costs,
in which case parties would only invest if they could be sure no
others were investing.93

89
See, e.g., Dombalagian, supra note 144, at 1–2 (discussing the drive to collect
information in financial markets, and the strength provided to the financial system when
information is widely disseminated).
90
See, e.g., Matthew Harding, Good Data Public Policies, in CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
FOUNDATION, THE FUTURE OF DATA-DRIVEN INNOVATION 43, 47 (2014) (discussing the
structural and cost burdens associated with generating and aggregating useful data).
91
See Pasquale, supra note 366 (discussing the “brute disadvantage” faced by search
engines without access to the user data held by Google).
92
See id.; Frank Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need for Qualified
Transparency in Internet Intermediaries, 104 NW. U.L. REV. 105, 156 n.273 (2010) (noting
that Internet Service Providers are gaining the capacity to track the kinds of content
transmitted through their systems).
93
See, e.g., Bradshaw, supra note 877, at 28 (discussing some of the advantages that can
accrue to a first-mover).
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III.

THE ROLE OF THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE
IN INFORMATION ECONOMIES
Access to this information as an essential facility fosters competition that benefits consumers. While many commentators suggest
a hands-off approach to antitrust intervention in dynamic information economies,94 others take the position that erring on the side
of requiring more competition at every level is better public policy.95 As one commentator mentioned:
It is impossible to find better interpretations and
applications of data without access to it . . . . Current advantage [in certain scale industries liked]
search is likely to be self-reinforcing, especially given that so many more people are using the services
now than when Google overtook other search engines in the early 2000s.96
When the above market conditions exist and one competitor
has possession of the essential facility as a result of investments in
exogenous markets or as a fortuitous side-effect of being the monopolist to which a network-economy tipped, or because it is simply in possession of information about intellectual property that is
instrumental to competition, public policy would suggest that the
resource be shared.97
Courts certainly will have to consider whether the possessor
happened upon the opportunity to possess the information—or
elected to invest in its creation and the extraction of its value for
another, independent, market in ruling on an essential facilities
94

See, e.g., Spulber & Yoo, supra note 499, at 1900–01.
See Cooper, supra note 20, at 1014 (“Moreover, when we come to information
industries and networks, public policy should be particularly procompetitive and err
toward requiring more, not less, competition. Interconnection creates greater leverage
than one finds in other markets. Information flows not only through the marketplace of
goods and services, but also through the marketplace of ideas.”).
96
See Pasquale, supra note 366 (illustrating how the First Amendment defense to
antitrust allegations leveled at search engines often skips any analysis of whether there is
any competition).
97
See, e.g., Mark R. Patterson, Leveraging Information About Patents: Settlements,
Portfolios, and Holdups, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 483, 484 (2012) (discussing the litigation
advantage held by patent holders due to uncertainty about the underlying patent’s scope
and validity, not the existence of infringement).
95
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doctrine claim.98 Barring situations in which the information is protected by intellectual property rights granting exclusive control for
all uses of the information, consumers of resulting goods and services benefit from policies encouraging the possessor to compete
for any additional profits from possession of the information.99 The
potential long-term impact on the dynamic market is discussed below.
A. What Are Monopolization and Monopoly in the Information
Economy?
As noted above in Part II, monopoly power is the ability to raise
prices without losing profits in information economies as well as
other markets. Whether information is the product, as in the provision of financial market information,100 or information is an input
into a product, such as predictive advertising101 or knowledge of a
pharmaceutical’s bioequivalency,102 the consumer harm is the ability to unilaterally raise prices or decrease quality.103 Although the
harm feared is the same in informational as well as other markets,
the ability to define and identify the presence of monopoly power
presents some of the greatest difficulty.104

98

See, e.g., Hienz, supra note 373, at 4 (“Data is an asset. As such, much of the data
generated every day is proprietary. An online retailer owns the data listing its customers’
purchases, and a pharmaceutical company owns data from testing its products. This is
appropriate, since businesses bear costs to generate, store, and analyze data and then
enjoy the innovative fruits that grow out of it.”).
99
See James Turney, Defining the Limits of the EU Essential Facilities Doctrine on
Intellectual Property Rights: The Primacy of Securing Optimal Innovation, 3 NW. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 179, 183 (2005) (“as a matter of policy, competition law should
not intervene to protect competitors unless the ultimate benefits to consumers outweigh
the rights of the intellectual property right holder.”).
100
See, e.g., supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text.
101
See, e.g., Adam Popescu, The Next Wave of Ads Knows Everything About You—Before
You Do, MASHABLE (July 26, 2013), http://mashable.com/2013/07/26/inference-adver
tising/.
102
See Brief for Federal Trade Commission as Amicus Curiae at 1, Mylan Pharms., Inc.
v. Celgene Corp., (No. 2:14-CV—2094-ES-MAH (D.N.J.) (ongoing 2015), 2014 WL
2968348, at *3.
103
See Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1070 (10th Cir. 2013).
104
See id. at 1071 (discussing how the issue of market definition and market power had
been stipulated by the parties, avoiding a protracted analysis on what is usually the core
issue).
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As discussed in Part II, above, the state of being a monopoly is
not itself a base of liability; acts of monopolization are necessary.
Monopolies that exist or are maintained as a result of business acumen, historic accident, or changes in consumer demand are not
the object of the antitrust laws.105 It is only when a firm seeks to
obtain a monopoly and presents a substantial danger of succeeding,106 or attempts to maintain a monopoly through anticompetitive
measures, that there is liability under the antitrust laws.107 Examples of monopolization that are pertinent to informational markets
include Microsoft’s multiple efforts to prevent Netscape from
gaining traction against Internet Explorer in order to preserve the
Windows operating system monopoly,108 and the continued purchasing of user data and the expertise necessary to understand it by
companies like Facebook and Google.109 Withholding an essential
facility from competitors to foreclose competition in an adjacent
market is the core theory of monopolization in this analysis.110
Competition in markets tends to take one of two forms, as discussed in Part II. Firms can compete against one another based on
price or quality within a market for a good (and attempt to monopolize the provision of that good), or firms can compete for a market
that can only support a single firm. Price competition within a market is exemplified by multiple firms producing highly substitutable
goods.111 Markets with this dynamic can, and are expected to, support multiple firms.112 By comparison, some markets are natural
105

See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429–30 (2d Cir. 1945); see
also Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61–62 (1911); Spulber & Yoo,
supra note 499, at 1826–27.
106
See Novell, 731 F.3d at 1071 n.2 (citing Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447,
459 (1993)).
107
See id. at 1070.
108
See id.
109
See Martin Robbins, Mark Zuckerberg’s Information Monopoly, VICE (Feb. 28, 2014),
http://www.vice.com/read/google-whatsapp-martin-robbins (discussing the implications
of Facebook’s acquisition of WhatsApp and Google’s prior acquisition of DeepMind
Technologies).
110
See, e.g., Spulber & Yoo, supra note 499, at 1833–34 (discussing the vertical
relationship of markets under the essential facilities doctrine).
111
See Alan J. Meese, Monopolization, Exclusion, and the Theory of the Firm, 89 MINN. L.
REV. 743, 773 (2005).
112
See Lao, supra note 53, at 291–97 (discussing the distinction between markets facing
dynamic competition compared to price competition).
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monopolies that can only sustain a single large firm, whether a local
telephone network113 or the market for PC software114 in information economies. These Schumpeterian markets exhibit competition for the market in a serial set of contests to become the sitting
monopolist.115
If a market is capable of supporting multiple firms competing
on quality or price, then market share is a useful proxy for market
power.116 Informational markets supporting multiple competitors
competing on price or quality are no different in analysis than comparable traditional markets.117 Monopoly power is represented by
the proxy of market share, or more rarely is shown by direct evidence,118 while monopolization continues to be the attempt to acquire or maintain the desired power through anticompetitive
means, including abuse of an essential facility.119
Monopolization in an environment of competition for the market takes on an entirely different color.120 Monopolists should be
permitted to, and encouraged to, compete on the merits in order to
innovate and offer better products at better prices.121 However, the
development of dynamic markets should not be impeded by the
actions of the sitting monopolist where subsequent innovation is
foreclosed.122 This is especially true where a monopolist is simultaneously utilizing monopoly power over a resource while adopting
the shield that market power is difficult to infer in a market imbued
with Schumpeterian tendencies.123
It is the opinion of many commentators that given the dynamic
nature of information economies, static measures of market power
113

See Gautier & Mitra, supra note 54, at 662.
See Schmalensee, supra note 55, at 193.
115
See id.
116
See, e.g., Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1071 (10th Cir. 2013).
117
See Weiser, supra note 60, at 575.
118
See United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 190–91 (3d Cir. 2005) (direct
evidence in a section 1 case).
119
See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 499, at 1826.
120
See discussion supra Part II.
121
See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 499, at 1827–28.
122
See Tilman Klumpp and Xuejuan Su, Open Access and Dynamic Efficiency, 2 AM.
ECON. J.: MICROECON. 64, 64 (2010).
123
See, e.g., Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064 (10th Cir. 2013).
114
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are inadequate under the circumstances.124 Static snapshots of a
market’s division do not account for the rapid pace of growth, innovation, and disruption of market positions.125 Assuming that this
argument that static measures of markets are imperfect gauges of
ongoing change is true, economic analyses still suggest that static
analysis may be sufficient for antitrust purposes (as well as one of
the most stable options conceptually).126 Where there is competition for a market, as opposed to price competition within a market,
the ability to exclude subsequent potential entrants from the market may initially incentivize innovation, but, if too effective, deter
innovation beyond the first-mover’s.127
B. What Does Control Over and Unjustified Denial of an Essential
Facility Look Like?
In order to establish a claim under the essential facilities doctrine in an information economy, in addition to identifying an essential facility as discussed above, a claimant must demonstrate
that the defendant exercised control of that facility (the first MCI
element) and denied access unjustifiably (the third MCI element).128 Accompanying the section, above, on identifying when a
facility is essential for competition in an information economy, was
a discussion of the economic and legal barriers that can exist to the
duplication of a facility.129 As discussed below, some of these attributes, such as intellectual property rights or the necessity of an
underlying natural monopoly to the development of information,
also speak to control of an essential facility by a monopolist.130

124

See, e.g., id. at 1071; Lao, supra note 53, at 291.
See Schmalensee, supra note 55, at 193.
126
See Joshua Gans, When is Static Analysis a Sufficient Proxy for Dynamic
Considerations? Reconsidering Antitrust and Innovation, in 11 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE
ECONOMY xiii (2011) (Introduction on file with author).
127
See id. (discussing how allowing an established incumbent to prevent entry has the
effect of reducing investment in innovation, which results in greater utility of static
analyses in assessing dynamic markets).
128
See MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132–33 (7th Cir.
1983); see also discussion supra Part II.
129
See discussion, supra, notes 77–93 and accompanying text.
130
See discussion, infra, notes 134–158 and accompanying text.
125
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Control of an essential facility can be understood as the ability
to exclude others from its use.131 Essential facilities in the information economy can be both information necessary to compete in
an industry or channels of distribution for information-related
products and services, as discussed in the above section on defining
essential facilities.132 The ability to restrict access to either essential
information or means of distribution in their entirety would
demonstrate control adequate for the essential facilities doctrine.133
If the essential facility is information, then exclusion can occur
as the result of intellectual property rights possessed over the information134 or simply by being the firm in possession of information that cannot feasibly be duplicated by competitors.135 Intellectual property rights over information essential to competition
are most likely to exist in the form of patents or trade secrets.136 In
most instances, copyright protection would extend only to a particular expression of the essential information and not the underlying
information itself.137 Similarly, the protection trademarks extend to
marks identifying manufacturers is unlikely to impact essential information.138 Additionally, mere possession of the information can
equate to control if the information is of a type incapable of duplication due to economic or practical realities.139
Possession of intellectual property rights over the essential information adds a complication to the essential facilities analysis.
Information in the information economy frequently has intellectual

131

See, e.g., Opi, supra note 388, at 502–03.
See discussion supra Part II.C.
133
See Lao, supra note 53, at 298.
134
See Joseph Farrell, Intellectual Property as a Bargaining Environment, 9 INNOV. POL’Y
AND THE ECON. 39, 39 (2009) (“Intellectual property policy relies on bargaining in the
shadow of exclusivity.”).
135
See discussion supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text.
136
See, e.g., Amy Rachel Davis, Note, Patented Embryonic Stem Cells: The Quintessential
“Essential Facility”?, 94 GEO. L. REV. 205, 218 n.58, 228–29 (2005); Lao, supra note 53,
at 282, 282 n.43.
137
See, Opi, supra note 388, at 448 (citing Mark R. Patterson, When is Property
Intellectual?: The Leveraging Problem, 73 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1133, 1139–41 (2000)).
138
See, e.g., Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 664 F.2d 1348, 1353 (9th Cir. 1982)
(describing trademarks as protecting the goodwill and quality standards of a business).
139
See discussion supra Part II.C.
132
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property rights attached.140 Although the mere existence of intellectual property rights, such as patents, is not determinative of
market power,141 if the information has already been deemed essential for competition in a market, then the grant of exclusivity confers market power.142 As in the realm of pay-for-delay agreements
with patents, the balance between intellectual property rights and
antitrust law is complicated.143 Patents and trade secrets, with their
grants of exclusivity, have different implications for the essential
facilities doctrine, which looks to unjustified denials of access.144
Although there may be uses of information outside of the grant of
the intellectual property rights implicating the essential facilities
doctrine, this Note primarily analyzes information unencumbered
by intellectual property.
Determining the appropriate balance between the exclusivity
given to holders of intellectual property rights and the essential facilities doctrine is not necessary within the scope of this Note.
However, the general criticism of the doctrine in the absence of
intellectual property suggests that policy arguments would favor
intellectual property over forced grants of access as an essential
facility.145
In the example supported by the FTC in its amicus brief, even
with situations involving intellectual property, the essential information can be information about the intellectual property and not
the information contained and protected by intellectual property
itself.146 The bioequivalencies of a patented pharmaceutical,147 the
scope and validity of a patent,148 or the pool of data used to refine

140

See Dombalagian, supra note 144, at 4.
See Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006).
142
See Farrell, supra note 1344, at 39.
143
See Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013).
144
See Pasquale, supra note 366 (describing how the information contained within a
patent is public and protected for a limited period, whereas trade secrets are protected for
as long as the information can remain hidden).
145
See Lao, supra note 53, at 307.
146
See Brief for Federal Trade Commission as Amicus Curiae at 1, Mylan Pharms., Inc.
v. Celgene Corp., (No. 2:14-CV-2094-ES-MAH (D.N.J.) (ongoing 2015), 2014 WL
2968348, at *1.
147
See id.
148
See Patterson, supra note 977, at 484.
141
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an algorithm protected as a trade secret149 are all within the realm
of the essential facilities doctrine and the more straightforward
analysis discussed next. The ability to exclude others from use of
information purely by their inability to access comparable alternatives is more straightforward. If it is (a) known from the analysis on
essentiality that information is not feasible to reproduce150 and it is
(b) known that only one firm possesses the information,151 then that
firm controls the information.
If the essential facility is the means of distributing information,
as opposed to the information itself, then the analysis focuses on
the degree of a firm’s control over the channels of distribution and
whether competitors are being denied access.152 In particular, if
there is evidence that the potential competitors could buy access to
the channel of distribution, then the monopolist is likely not denying access.153 Especially if the monopolist is providing retail access
to non-competitors at the same price offered to potential competitors.154 Even asking for an access fee in excess of the retail cost is
not determinative on the question of whether access is being unjustifiably denied to competitors.155 Whether a monopolist elects to
offer access to its resource may also depend on any inherent capacity limits for the resource that would force a choice between their
own uses and access to others.156 In the absence of anticompetitive
purpose, even a monopolist can choose whom to deal with and on
what terms,157 including extracting the monopoly price from a potential competitor through price-discrimination.158
Proof of denial of access to an essential facility must be buttressed by evidence that the denial was unjustified.159 Innovation in
149

See Pasquale, supra note 366.
See discussion supra Part II.C.
151
This aspect is necessary for the firm to be the proper defendant to any litigation as a
monopolist, a point an improperly sued litigant would surely raise in a motion to dismiss.
152
See Lao, supra note 53, at 298.
153
See id.
154
See In re Adderall XR Antitrust Litigation, 754 F.3d 128, 135 (2d Cir. 2014).
155
See id. (discussing the Supreme Court’s consideration of refusal to sell at retail price
as a factor to consider).
156
See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 499, at 1861.
157
See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
158
See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 499, at 1859.
159
See Lao, supra note 53, at 301–02.
150
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goods and services receives incentives from many directions: intellectual property rights, public investment in research, the profit
motive in an capitalist economy, and competition from competitors
for those profits are just a few examples.160 Few intellectuals would
go so far as to say that any of the above incentives alone is adequate
to sustain innovation, and one focus is to find a mix of incentives to
innovate.161 Demonstrating a justification for denial that is not likely to support innovation will best frame an essential facilities doctrine claim.
In the context of broadband networks, ISPs have been considered competitors of a cable-affiliated ISP where the network for
transmission—cable transmission particularly—was controlled by
a monopolist.162 In the context of “music download platforms,”
Apple’s use of Digital Rights Management (DRM) software to restrict downloaded music to Apple products was held not to be anticompetitively wielding market power.163 Instead, between the exclusivity granted to copyrighted materials and the work-around of
burning music to a CD before reloading it into a different music
platform that was available to consumers, the DRM was found not
to be a facility essential for the development of platforms.164
Many information-based economies, such as the “burgeoning
worlds of social and mobile computing” require a great deal of infrastructure to reach scale, and may also require the proprietary
information that comes from “a base of users that ‘train’” a system.165 Also to be considered is whether the denial of the use of the

160

See generally BHASKAR SASTRY, MARKET STRUCTURE AND INCENTIVES FOR
INNOVATION (June 2005), available at http://www.intertic.org/Policy%20Papers/Sastry
.pdf.
161
See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 255, at 1533 (“What we have long known in intellectual
property, that innovation and creativity require a mix of property and robust, substantial
commons, is true more generally for complex modern economies.”) (arguing that another
factor that can increase innovation is recognition of certain assets as commons that should
be accessible to all).
162
See Cooper, supra note 20, at 1023–24 (discussing AT&T v. City of Portland, No.
CV99-65-PA (D. Or. June 7, 1999).
163
See Elkin-Koren, supra note 188, at 1154 n.121.
164
See id.
165
See Pasquale, supra note 366 (discussing how it would take “Goliaths like Facebook
and Apple” to displace Google from these markets, a result that would not assuage the
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facility is able to be justified in some manner, be it through the
standard of a legitimate business justification,166 or a demonstrably
pro-competitive justification.
C. How Feasible is Requiring Access to the Facility for Competitors?
Information is a non-exhaustible, highly shareable resource.167
Much like the characteristics defining information economies, once
developed, the marginal cost of sharing information is relatively
low.168 Further, at no point can a limit be reached where no more
individuals can use information.169 With the exception of information carrying legally-enforceable limits on distribution, such as
intellectual property170 or government restrictions,171 information
bears few of the structural limitations to access that plague many
other essential facilities or resources.172
Even channels of distribution for information are often less capacity-restricted than traditional channels of distribution. As highlighted by Professor Lao, if the purported essential facility in search
is access to information by consumers, then the channels for information are numerous: in addition to Google, consumers have access to Bing, Yahoo, Facebook, as well as URLs.173 Only when the
essential facility is alleged to be a finite resource like the top search
result, or the first page of results, do feasibility concerns arise.174
concerns of monopolization of pools of data presenting “brute disadvantages” to
potential competitors).
166
See Lao, supra note 53, at 308–13 nn.246–47 (suggesting that similarly to the dicta in
Aspen that a legitimate business justification can support a refusal to deal, some essential
facility caselaw suggests the same standard is applicable to denial of use of an essential
facility).
167
See Dombalagian, supra note 144, at 5–6.
168
See JOSEPH KENNEDY, THE DATA-DRIVEN ECONOMY, in U.S. CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE FOUNDATION, THE FUTURE OF DATA-DRIVEN INNOVATION 17 (2014),
available at http://www.uschamberfoundation.org/sites/default/files/Data%20Report%
20Final%2010.23.pdf.
169
See Hienz, supra note 373, at 3.
170
See Farrell, supra note 1344, at 39.
171
See Hatch & Pippert, supra note 5 (discussing distribution limitations enforced by the
FDA).
172
See, e.g., Lao, supra note 53, at 302–04 (discussing the limits accompanying defining
the first slot as an essential facility).
173
See id. at 298–301.
174
See id. at 302–04.
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Paying the marginal cost of added capacity to a channel of distribution is a potential solution for circumstances involving structural
limitations.175
Granting access to information and channels of distribution
does not require courts to act as a “central authority,” always setting prices.176 Royalty rates can be negotiated based on the value of
information to potential competitors.177 These rates do, however,
have the potential to approximate monopoly prices.178
Where capacity is not a significant limiting factor, and the monopolist’s use of the facility is not impeded by the added use of a
competitor, access can be granted on a variety of terms.179 Access
can be provided on a retail basis,180 on a wholesale basis,181 or on
the basis of “interconnection,” “platform,” “bundled,” or “unbundled” access to the essential facility.182 Where capacity is a significant constraint, the monopolist first has a stronger argument
that the denial of access is justified,183 and second has greater ability to approach monopoly pricing for access, even with court supervision.184 Many channels of distribution for information are under regulatory burdens,185 which might require permitting access,186 provide a pricing structure,187 or remove the necessity of

175

See, e.g., Spulber & Yoo, supra note 499, at 1844.
See id. at 1867–69 (discussing the judiciary’s lack of skill at the task and positing
methods of access that can mitigate the dangers).
177
See Davis, supra note 1366, at 245–46.
178
See id.
179
See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 499, at 1874–1907 (discussing a multitude of forms of
access left open by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Trinko).
180
See id. at 1878–83.
181
See id. at 1883–87.
182
See id. at 1888–1907.
183
See discussion supra note 156 and accompanying text.
184
See Davis, supra note 1366, at 245–46.
185
See Lao, supra note 53, at 288 (discussing the multitude of regulated natural
monopolies and public utilities that come to be defined as essential facilities).
186
See, e.g., Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 408–09 (2004) (describing how the regulatory structure had in the instant case not
required access enforceable under the antitrust laws).
187
For example the maximum access rates set by the FCC. Understanding Your
Telephone Bill, FCC http://www.fcc.gov/guides/understanding-your-telephone-bill (last
visited Apr. 8, 2015).
176
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antitrust analysis completely.188 In many instances, fostering competition is a goal of the regulatory body. For example, the FCC has
focused on “foster[ing] competition, in particular cost-oriented
access to essential local network facilities, and [] promot[ing] an
open network architecture.”189
Some channels of information distribution may be evaluated as
the equivalent of infrastructure, potentially to the degree of being a
regulated utility.190 Even advocates of treating “privately-owned
commercial infrastructure” as a commons suggest that the proper
mechanism for doing so are the “essential facilities [doctrine] on
the antitrust side, and natural monopoly and social policy constraints on the regulatory side” as opposed to direct government
regulations.191 Included in this proposal are several reasons why
private owners might permit access on a commons-equivalent basis, or, alternatively, justifications for requiring access, namely:
“engaging competitors in cooperative codevelopment, engaging
users, and maintaining flexibility in the face of uncertainty.”192
The feasibility of requiring access in information economies is
not a significant enough burden to pose a systematic challenge to
the essential facilities doctrine.193 Many forms of access exist that
can address or mitigate a multitude of concerns related to this element of the essential facilities doctrine.194
D. Addressing Weaknesses in the Application of the Essential Facilities
Doctrine
Some commentators, including Phillip Areeda, have expressed
concern over the essential facilities doctrine requiring grants of ac188

See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408–09.
See Cooper, supra note 20, at 1027 n.40.
190
See FCC Launches Broad Rulemaking to Protect and Promote the Open Internet, FCC,
http://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-launches-broad-rulemaking-protect-and-promoteopen-internet (last visited Apr 8, 2015).
191
See Benkler, supra note 255, at 1526–27.
192
See id. at 1528 (“These reasons certainly do cohere with the experience of network
and high-technology industries . . . . That is, where downstream innovation increases the
total value of the infrastructure, commons management can encourage that downstream
effort.”).
193
See, e.g., Spulber & Yoo, supra note 499, describing five forms of access that can be
utilized post-Trinko.
194
See generally id.
189
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cess to utilities under the guise of a tipped-network economy when,
in fact, the utility is replicable or other alternatives exist.195 Given
the stringent requirements of proof for the essential facilities doctrine, these critiques read more as hornbooks on defending against
a claim than arguments to eliminate the doctrine from antitrust
law.196
Additionally, information is often considered as an item of intellectual property, and in many instances is encapsulated within
the grant of exclusivity accompanying copyrights or patents.197 Requiring access to these resources cannot disregard the attached intellectual property rights, and the essential facilities doctrine is unlikely to supersede the policy of incentivizing innovation through
granting exclusivity. Concerns about intellectual property, and its
interaction with antitrust law, are ongoing considerations198 outside
the immediate scope of this piece. However, the presence of intellectual property is no more a universal protection of information
held by a firm199 than it is a presumption of market power.200
There are also persuasive economic theories that undercut the
utility of the essential facilities doctrine.201 Proprietary standards
may be “a natural-monopoly bottleneck,” but if the underlying
market is ordinarily dynamic, requiring access could forestall inno-

195
See Dombalagian, supra note 144, at 60–61 n.245, citing Phillip Areeda, Essential
Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841 (1990) for the
premise that it is difficult to limit the essential facilities doctrine so as not to force a duty
to deal on dominant networks by virtue of their status.
196
See discussion supra Part II.C., where this information would be useful in challenging
the essential nature of a facility.
197
See Elkin-Koren, supra note 188, at 1154 n.121 (noting how copyright protection of
DRM software undercut arguments that Apple was abusing its dominance in the music
download market as there was no obligation to grant access to the DRM, and the DRM
itself was not essential to downloading music).
198
See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
199
See, e.g., Patterson, supra note 977, at 484–85; see also Brief for Federal Trade
Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff at 1, Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
Celgene Corp., No. 2:14-CV-2094-ES-MAH (D.N.J.) (ongoing 2015), 2014 WL 2968348,
at *1; see discussion supra Part III.B.
200
See Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006).
201
See, e.g., Spulber & Yoo, supra note 499, at 1836–37 (discussing the One Monopoly
Rent theory).
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vation that would make the proprietary standard irrelevant.202 A
market with competition but little innovation avoids the extraction
of monopoly rent, but may provide less welfare to consumers in the
long-run, than a “serial monopoly” where rents are extracted, but
innovation means larger returns in utility for consumers.203 In an
information economy consistently described as subject to Schumpeterian disruption and innovation, it is argued that even the (“unspoken”) rule of thumb that “Big is Bad” is inapt given that size is
not strongly correlated with economic staying power, with AOL
given as a prime example.204 However, just as the appropriate
measure of market power in Schumpeterian markets continues to
be disputed, the anticompetitive or procompetitive impact of many
actions is as-yet undetermined, and should not be declared per se
legal before experience can make an appropriate judgment.205
Just as the high investment costs may deter any entry into a
market by firms building their products or services from the ground
up,206 requiring access to existing informational infrastructures can
over-incentivize entry.207 This has the potential to reduce consumer welfare through wasted investment resources and the failing of
superfluous firms.208
202

See Richard N. Langlois, Design, Institutions, and the Evolution of Platforms, 9 J.L.
ECON & POL’Y 1, 4 (2012) (discussing Joseph Schumpeter’s impact on the analysis of
whether intervention is warranted).
203
See id. (arguing that serial monopolies are likely, and preferable in markets bound by
narrow technological standards, but that “[e]ven when platform standards are relatively
wide in scope and seemingly durable . . . it may well be that competition among platforms
remains the superior alternative, especially if one refuses to see antitrust and other forms
of regulation as disinterested and costless”).
204
See Lao, supra note 53, at 317–19.
205
See, e.g., James Keyte, Reasonable as a Matter of Law: The Evolving Role of the Court in
Rule of Reason Cases, ANTITRUST MAG. (Summer 2014) (discussing the potential for per
se legality on vertical restraints after Leegin).
206
See discussion supra accompanying notes 89–92, on the cost-structures in the
marketplace that could deter entry and permit only those with current access to an
essential resource to build out.
207
See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 499, at 1843–45.
208
See Thomas W. Hazlett, The Irony of Regulated Competition in Telecommunications, 4
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 6 (2002) (“Where firms—entrants or incumbents—have
been allowed wide latitude in constructing new networks, robust investment incentives
have resulted and consumer gains have been realized. Where regulators have,
alternatively, ambitiously regulated incumbents through network sharing obligations
designed to ease entry barriers, an unsuitable level of entry has occurred that has resulted
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Some antitrust commentators, looking at the essential facilities
doctrine within the context of information economies, view the
policy considerations as favoring a limited construction of the doctrine.209 For example, it is argued that requiring Google to provide
“access” to the top result slot would freeze innovation in the market for search, and prevent competition with the evolving products
and services offered by Apple, Facebook, and Amazon.210 However, this critique is distinguishable in that the top result slot is a nonshareable resource and is a product of consistently changing utility
to consumers, as indicated earlier in the same argument.211 As Professor Lao states: “A distinction should be drawn between a simple
preference for one’s own products and services, on the one hand,
and unjustified affirmative conduct to block the competitive process, on the other.”212
An additional concern is present in the information economy:
the “self-reinforcing ‘Matthew Effect’ . . . to those who already
have much, more is given.”213 According to a “somewhat skeptical” Professor Lao, the argument that requiring access to essential
facilities will negatively impact the incentives to invest and innovate “seem[s] overstated,” in part as “mandatory sharing may unleash innovation and competition from rivals in the downstream
market.”214
Although there are a number of criticisms of the essential facilities doctrine, both by itself,215 and in the context of the information
economy,216 none are so persuasive as to require setting aside the
in widespread losses across the industry without countervailing consumer benefits. By
limiting the award of ‘options’ to access existing network infrastructure, rational
investment calculation will return to the sector, restoring productive growth.”).
209
See Lao, supra note 53, at 313.
210
See id. at 314–15.
211
See id. at 302–04, 317 (“Giving priority to a search engine’s own proprietary content
in the presentation of search results is quite different [than Microsoft and Netscape, or
Lorain Journal] because it does not affirmatively thwart a competitor’s efforts to
compete.”).
212
Id. at 316.
213
Pasquale, supra note 366 (citing Robert Merton).
214
See Lao, supra note 53, at 314.
215
See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
410–11 (2004).
216
See generally Lao, supra note 53.
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doctrine in light of the different market structures inherent in information economies whose long-term implications are as-yet unknown.
E. Aligning the Purpose of the Essential Facilities Doctrine With
Competition in the Information Economy
The essential facilities doctrine seeks to benefit consumers by
encouraging competition in markets that are susceptible to extension of a monopolist’s control. Information economies are particularly dynamic, and information has an important role to play in subsequent innovation and competition. With information economies,
as the information involved can generate innovation and subsequent competition in its own right, access to that information is
closely tied to the continued evolution of the new economy.217
When the market in which a facility is denied is itself one dedicated
to innovation, such as stem cell research denied access to patented
stem cell technology, then the denial is additionally egregious.218
Consumers are more likely to see benefits when more competitors have access to the information necessary to compete in a market, or in Schumpeterian environments for the market. Competition for potential profits is a driving premise of capitalism.219 Fostering competition to create new products and services,220 to innovate on the quality or cost of existing services,221 and to add more
competitors to the fight for Schumpeterian markets222 is likely to
217

See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 20, at 1027 n.40 (“What is threatened if open
competition [for access to the Internet] is not maintained, is the continuing evolution of
the Internet, the innovation in and the evolution of electronic network-based business,
and therefore the competitive development of the network economy as a whole . . . Since
damage to the dynamic of the Internet evolution could cause great economic harm, policy
should start from a presumption that competition in access and throughout the Internet
system must be maintained.”).
218
See Davis, supra note 1366, at 222 (2005) (“[T]he essential facilities doctrine seems
like a logical means of compelling an upstream patent holder to provide access to those
research tools deemed ‘essential’ to competition in downstream innovation markets.”).
219
See, e.g., Goss Int’l Corp. v. Man Roland Druckmaschinen Aktiengesellschaft, 434
F.3d 1081, 1099 (8th Cir. 2006) (Smith, J., concurring) (“Competition is the very
hallmark of American free enterprise.”).
220
See Hienz, supra note 373, at 5–6.
221
See KENNEDY, supra note 1688, at 9.
222
See Pasquale, supra note 366.
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result in better outcomes for consumers.223 Although requiring access to information developed by one firm has the potential to decrease the incentives of all firms to invest in information gathering
and innovation, rigorous enforcement of the requirement that a facility be essential is an opposing consideration mitigating this concern.224
Innovation, interoperability, and competition are defining characteristics of information economies both in the United States and
large portions of the world, and the information necessary to accomplish these goals is an important foundational element.225 Information is no less susceptible to characterization as a resource or
facility than tangible items, and the economic and legal concepts
underpinning the essential facilities doctrine are pertinent to encouraging competition and innovation.226
CONCLUSION
Information economies are no less susceptible to the existence
of essential facilities or resources than other segments of the economy. Perhaps information has a greater likelihood of being essential
to competition, given the capacity of information to be shared, the
high fixed costs that can accompany its development, and its integral role in many lines of commerce. These possibilities are further
bolstered by the reality that information begets innovation, which is
a fundamental part of recent economic growth.
Considering that information economies are yet to be understood to the same degree as more traditional economies, even doctrines that have found limited applicability in one venue may find
more utility in a new environment. As laid out in the discussions
above, the elements of the essential facilities doctrine have many
potential footholds in information economies that were more lim223

See Gans, supra note 1266, at 56.
See discussion supra Part III.C.
225
See Marina Lao, Networks, Access, and ‘Essential Facilities’: From Terminal Railroad to
Microsoft, 62 SMU L. Rev. 557, 557–58 (2009).
226
See id. at 557–58 (“[T]he same legal and economic principles are equally applicable
even if the ‘facility’ is information or some other intangible asset. Thus, the doctrine can
also be effective in redressing competitive problems caused by the lack of access or
interoperability in modern network industries.”).
224
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ited before. There are policy arguments in addition to these structural elements that may provide new opportunity for the doctrine.
The very nature of innovation and competition in information
economies makes for a strong policy argument that favoring greater
access to information as an essential facility has the potential to
benefit consumers through greater competition and innovation.

